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RECENT CASES.
AGENCY, UNDISCLOSED - SALES - CONDITIONS AGAINST RE-ENGAGING IN
BusiNzss-HmBLEN v. BIRCd, 59 N. Y. Supp. 4o.-Plaintiff bought out a res-
taurant with the understanding that the vendor would not thereafter, directly
or indirectly, engage or be interested in restaurant business in that city. The
business belonged to defendant's wife, Louisa L. Birch. but was conducted
for her by the defendant, he signing her name, L. L. Birch, without any quali-
fication or addition. He signed and indorsed checks in her name. and bill of
sale of the business to plaintiff was so signed by him. It contains this pro-
vision, "and I further agree that I will not be connected in any way or have
capital invested in any restaurant or lunch room in the city of Yonkers accord-
ing to verbal agreement." Held, the fact that he fails to disclose his agency
does not render the condition applicable, to him individually
The courts lay down the broad rule that where an agent in his dealings
with third parties does not disclose his principal, he is personally liable on the
contracts. This rule is supported by all authorities. i Amer. and Eng. Encycl.
of Law, 2d ed., 1122. But in the above case the rule of law does not go to
the extent to involve a separate and distinct penalty to be borne by the agent
personally in addition to the one which could be enacted against the principal
whenever her identity is disclosed. He can be made to pay any damages sus-
tained by plaintiff from any breach of warranty contained in the contract,
including damages resulting from carrying on the prohibited business by the
principal. But the agent, because of his failure to disclose his agency, since
no fraud was perpetrated by him, cannot be enjoined from entering a business
prohibited only to the vendor, because if that were the case the vendee -would
have acquired the right to enjoin two individuals from competing with him
where he intended and expected to acquire the right of enjoining one.
ASSESSMENT FOR PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-FORCED CONTRIBUTIONS-CITY OF
SHREVEPORT V. PRESCOTT ET AL., 26 So. Rep. 664 (La.).-A local assessment
to pay the cost of street improvements levied under compulsion of law alone,
i. e., without the knowledge or consent of the abutting proprietors, is a tax,
because such assessment is predicated upon fiat of the Legislature and not upon
petitions signed by abutting property owners.
The court in this case has evidently not used "tax" in the way the term
is ordinarily understood. For in its ordinary meaning a tax is not an assess-
ment, as recognized in the cases of In re 01ening of Streets, 20 La. An.
499, and Munson v. Atclafulaya Basin Levee District, 43 La. An. 15. An
assessment is undoubtedly a species of tax, being levied under a taxing power,
and it would seem to be in this sense that the court uses it. But granted this,
the reasoning is peculiar. The fact that the abutting property owners have had
no say in its levy makes it a tax. We have never seen this urgend before as a
means of distinguishing a tax from an assessment. In the case of Indianapolis
v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175, they consider a levy an assessment when made for the
purpose of local improvement and not petitioned fgr- by the abutting property
owners. The same view is held in the case of Bakery. Tobins et aL., 40 Ind.
31o. In both cases the city charter allows the Common Council to make such
assessment upon a two-thirds vote. We understand a better distinction to be
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this; a tax is laid upon a person, there must be some person to tax, and a
default is necessary before the property can be levied on, while an assessment is
laid on the property and it must pay it. Here is a distinction, but the reasons
the Louisiana courts give are as applicable to an assessment as to a tax, and
consequently as far as we can see establish no distinction.
CosTs IN ADMILALTY-EXPENSE OF PROCURING RELEASE BONDS-THE
SOUTH PORTLAND, 95 Fed. Rep. 295.-The expenses incurred in procuring
from a surety company the execution of a bond for the release-of a libeled
vessel is a legitimate item of costs to be taxed in his favor. It has not been
customary heretofore to allow anything to owners of vessels who successfully
defend suits in rem against their property as compensation for expenses inci-
dent to furnishing the security required of them by law and the rules of prac-
tice. Such owners consequently were either deprived of the use of their prop-
erty or prevailed upon wealthy persons to aid them by becoming sureties.
With the growth of surety companies an easy and legitimate means of pro-
curing such security as is required is offered. The awarding of costs in admi-
ralty proceedings being a matter of discretion with the court (i Enc. P1 &
Prac. 290), it would seem to be a decidedly business-like and common sense view
that the court has taken in ruling as it has done in this case. A surety com-
pany is now allowed on the bond of any executor and can have the expenses
taken out of the estate.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DUPLICITY- JOINDER OF OFFENSES. - STATE V.
HEWES, 57 Pac. Rep. 959. The defendant was charged with the murder of
Robert Bornar "by hitting him with a club, and by shooting him with a cer-
tain pistol," etc. The defendant appealed from a district court to the Supreme
Court of Kansas, complaining, among other things, that the charge was bad
for duplicity and uncertainty because it did not particularly state whether
Bornar's death resulted from clubbing or shooting. Held, where an offense
charged may be committed by two different means, since several acts con-
nected with and forming part of a general offense may be stated in a single
count, its commission by both means may be charged in one count of the infor-
mation, and proof of any one will sustain the allegation."
To uphold this decision, which is at variance with the general rules of the
joinder of offenses, the court relies on State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 33 Pac 287,
in which it was held that where a murder may have been committed by dif-
ferent means, and it is doubtful which was employed, its commission by all
may be charged in one count of the information, and proof of any one will
sustain the allegation, but the means so charged in the same count of the in-
formation must not be repugnant. It would clearly seem that, according to
the general law of criminal procedure, the charge against Bornar would be bad
for duplicity, since it joins the offenses of murder by hitting with a club and
of murder by shooting with a pistol in the same count; the proper method
would be to state each offense in a separate count of the information. As
Clark on Criminal Procedure puts it, "Any number of counts charging the
same offense in different ways may be joined in the same indictment to meet
the evidence and avoid a variance in the proof." To be sure the rule against
duplicity "does not prevent the charging in one count of more acts than one
if such acts were all part of the transaction constituting the offense charged."
Barnes v. State, 20 Conn. 232; State v. Hodges, 45 Kansas 389; but this
means, as stated in Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick (Mass.) 360, "where two
crimes are of the same nature and necessarily so connected that they may,
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and, when botk are committed, must constitute but one legal offense, they
should be included in one charge." The familiar example given is of assault
and battery; these are separate acts, and yet when both are committed they
may be prosecuted in the same court, since both taken together constitute but
one legal offense. The point of the case under discussion is: All murder by
beating and murder by shooting, taken together, constitute but one legal
offense. It would seem that they are separate offenses and should be charged,
in different counts, since each by itself constitutes a legal offense.
DEFECTIVE HIGHWAYS-PROXIMATE CAusE- ABsENcE OF GUARD RAIL.-
BOONE V. EAST NORWEGIAN TowNSHIrP, 43 Ad. Rep. 1025 (Penn.). Husband of
plaintiff was driving over an unprotected declivity at side of highway, and the
horse becoming frightened and kicking his leg over the wagon shaft, the team
went over the unguarded declivity, and husband of plaintiff was killed. Held,
that absence of guard rail was proximate cause of death, although horse had
kicked his leg over wagon shaft.
There exist no finer distinctions than those made in the determination of
proximate causes. This case is important as emphasizing certain character.
istic cases concerning the doctrines of which there can now be no ambiguity.
The leading casa states that when several concurring acts or 6onditions of
things, one of them a wrongful act of defendant, produce the injury which
would not have been produced but for the wrongful act or omission, such act
or omission is the proximate cause of the injury. Camjybell v. Stillwater, 32
Minn. 388.
ELECTRIc WIRES-NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENc.-DEVIJN ET AL.
v. BEAcoN LIGHT CO., 43 Atl. Rep. 962 (Penn.). Plaintiff passing along street,
stepped upon wire lying along sidewalk, which by this act of plaintiff came
into contact with heavily charged wires and thus gave shock to plaintiff which
caused severe injiries. Held, that it is negligence for Electric Light Com-
pany to leave unguarded wire lying upon street in such position that it may
come into contact with heavily charged wire; also, contributory negligence
must be proved and not presumed from acts of person stepping on wire.
This is one of the cases in which electrical companies are held to most rigid
liability. Such a company is now held responsible for defects in insulation, non.
insulation, careless constructive work, falling of poles, wires, etc. Ordinarily
the rule as to negligence has embraced those cases in which a party has shown
want of ordinary or reasonable care in respect to what it was the duty of
the party to do or to leave undone. The prudence of the reasonable man
about his own affairs was all that was required, and in the case of rail-
roads and electric ompanies this degree of care would apply to the ordinary
and customary apparatus of their businesses. But now the rule is extended,
and electrical companies in particular must prevent the slightest possibility of
injury, even though only indirectly caused by their apparatus, which is now
considered the proximate cause. American courts are in accord on this point.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is given much weight.
EVIDENCE-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NOT NECESSARY TO BRING IT BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT.-PEOPLE v. VERENsENoCxOCKocK OFF, 58 Pac. Rep. z56.:-An
appeal for error in instructions to the jury as to value and effect of the evi-
dence. Held, that a bill of exceptions to bring up the evidence is unnecessary.
This is an interesting decision, coming from the Supreme Court of Califor.
nia whose opinions are generally held to be good law, because it would appear
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that th; weight of judicial decision bad almost established the law the other
way. It was objected in this case that the instructions to the jury could notbe
reviewed without the evidence, because it would not otherwise appear that
they were improper and injurious. " But the court said it would be pre-
sumed that there was evidence of some character to which the instructions
would applyand where such instructions would be erroneous "as applied to all
possible evidence to which it would be applicable," then error existed. If this
decision is followed the law on this point will be directly changed. In Kelly v.
Doyle, 5 4 P. 394, the court said: "Alleged errors in giving instructions will not
be reviewed where the abstract does not fully set forth the instructions, and the
evidence on which they were based," and the rule was stated in almost identi-
cal terms in Eickhof v. Chicago M. S. St. Ry. Co., 77 Ill. App. 196, thus:
"The appellate court will not consider the instructions unless all the evidence
upon which they were based is before it." For a similar emphatic statement of
the rule see Felmet v. Southern Ex5. Co., 31 S. E. 722, and Yates v. United
States, go Fed. 57.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-SERVICE OF PRocEss UPON AGENT-WAL. v. CiZs-
APEAKE AND OHIO R. R. Co., 95 Fed. 1ep. 39 8.-A person employed in Chicago
to solicit business and give information on behalf of a foreign railroad corpora-
tion, having no power to make contracts for the company, is not an agent on
whom service of process against the company can legally be made under Illi-
nois statute.
Wood, J., dissents, arguing on the ground that the power to make con-
tracts is not the test of agency. The decision of this case turns primarily upon
the interpretation of the State statute governing the service of process. The
statute does not designate with any precision who is to be such an agent, that
he may be served with process. The court in deciding this case in conformity
with its previous ruling in Fairbank & Co. v. Cincinnati, 9 U. S. Appeal 212,
seems to have laid down good law in spite of the excellent reasons expressed
in the opinion of the dissenting justice. A careful reading of the case of Max-
well v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 286, which gives the law on
this subject, will show that he misunderstood the facts in the case of Block v.
Atci'son, '. &- S. F. Co.. 21 Fed. Rep. 529, the only authority he gives in
support of his views.
ILLEGAL CONSIDERATiON-GAMING.-ST. Louis FAR ASSOCIATION V. CAR-
MODY ET AL., 52, S. W. 365.-Where plaintiff, in addition to conducting law-
ful races had arranged booths and appliances for gambling on the races, and
contracted with defendant whereby he was to furnish refreshments, thus
increasing the attraction and promoting the gambling. Held, that such
contract was illegal and void.
This case discusses "illegal consideration,"and purports to base its de.
cision on this ground. It also states the contract to be '" against public policy,"
and this would seem to be the true ground for its invalidity. The decision, if
resting upon the doctrine of illegality of consideration, would carry that to a
great extent. There was nothing illegal in the specific privileges for which
the defendant (appellant) contracted, and the invalidity of the contract seems
to arise out of its pernicious effects, since it, in its operation, promoted an ille-
gal act, and the presumed intention of the parties must have been that it
would do this. This was the ground of the decision in the case of Pearce v.
Brooks, x L. R. Exch. 213, cited by the court as referred to in Michael v.
Bacon, 49 Mo. 475, and given weight in the opinion.
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LAND BORDERmIG 0 LAK.E-AmiuALYDE Aam ELmw-SAE v- FRAZExa AL.,
26 S. Rep. 37& (La-)-The plaintiF appealed-f'ofni jadgment for defendants,
in which heprayed. for an injunction restraining the'defendants from taking
grass from: the bedi of a. lak of whichr the- plaintiff ripaii owner-
ship. Held. thaith&-temporary-uncovering of parts of the bed of the lake by
recunrring-annuatebh of the-waters which-beamnacovremiagainbytheir rise
or flow-, does not constituta derelicton.
ThItiacorrectly-bel
that the United States has. determinedthat th&questiOmcof whether thelands
formingthL-bedriofthre. watmmrs: gifs- P . tatm.. i~vnM
dlepen , uaerelynpothrIaloE tih- Stat: where th- anrs--are .armvr.
Jordaa, r4a tL S..- T hercmrtirrtbir.i --si anCod
whichfioywstheynghserur-,thttherecauldie-nraTeffctrre Zerv-
Yacht ui, 34-L z-An. 83g.
NsuzI-EA~as-flPoaa GAI Q Yx E NCESSAIZx S"A~nr- v.
ITo5Km -M HAUIANIr - Ga. 55 Y- M., Supp-An: eTevator,- of standard
makman-fily- eq!ie with: al the latest safety- appliane an reg-
ninTy iM-keCted became-stalebetweee the- secam and thid ffoorsof a
- 1 .. pt: wee--Trref auetheobsrucI - -whiffnrEVe& rbe-&-pfec-of
bunftk-us~imecattig car a. shorttim- Prewiously.. Thefeasibilifty
car by meas:of leer proved murviing. The engineerfinaly-sezzt Ir
Thletrtia counthucbmicttte l the qr-etion r the janry. wIL t statmen that
was nem ssary t-o avoi= v -a ' ai-ty
expern with ot LU'.U& =V jso Imsx- take. eie- rm.
,Clearly-nat- Iix> crdla v- Buibr_ G t53 Nra m -
reuiuiietfhtgreater--degrme:of usrnei -dmlentazt Sa-mzkon: the
to beepetan& o MLrcaseswh danger-is: to be- g tp se iE dme- and-
Prerori obeve by-the- pa-sxe the- owner-im responsilE-oaniy- 
fi=r
wat-- - e Th-iioheltpappliedaswelL trns-
laxth Tltalcae o Rx : ~el.6I I 7 itt aRs::ad h
ijury- might resuIlt he sena shol ha-tak eery- precautioo
reaonbl-posil~n T Tv FnirpT i.it!- :ut3ns fnwrn hs whc-
OSRUCTION or mw~~-ancsa-ouns U-. M.RY- Co.- 1r-
AL-, 43 A±I., Reg- 995 (N:- - -).-kff ifronta7sthlesI-wned-hy-
o f usne-f enants;-was injur by-if ling- of bale of hay;, wich klha beer
epu ed by- a oeenda wa bi moade. r nwagon muanothe-
of defendant-m- Held. that- abutting- property-ownersrorrstreethave-right-to-
temnpoailyobstict street for-unloadingof merchandibse- to such extentas is7
absolntelyimecessary;, and arenuotbound-tohrnnisksaftepassage-aroundsxck
obstruction to passers-by.
In the initial case- of Be= v. Russell, 6 East,. 427; it was declared that
while aproprietor might mak such use of the street as the tansacto of-
his business demanded, yet if resuting- obstru ionok traffi .a so: often
repeatedas to operate- as a permanent obstructionhe wa-Iiale. and& must_
RECEATT CASES.
seek such place of business as would not necessitate such hindrance, and
menace to ordinary traffic.. In this country-two very-si lar cases enunciate
the same principles: that the obstruction mustoccurintransaction of business,
mustbenecessary, and must-btemeorary; that the right of obstructionmust
be exercised in a. reasonable manner. Welch v. Wilso, TOL NY. 2s4
Jochem v. Robisrox, 66 Wis. 638. This right of obstruction- is so well
determine& thatia severa American cases it has been said decisively thatthL-
obstmetor isandnflutoffnnibinga-aff-passageaouncthe-obstuction.
R.roAs-Aomn As Amcrmo Com irro.z My= r m---Aacmsom-,.
T. &- S F. Ry.. v. HnwA, 94, F. R- 294--B-eId, that plaintiff a boy of r4_
could recover damag although he- was injure while negligently po
defendantsstrackw
Imthi..am-__mm of: the --,0 WI -,,,-'T-, wsthe-oy-mrr ag,
asd tIh fferhewas ttyiof contrbutory- .egige=- T s-cas--
b e loa -n g , th at c la bt 1 e- eg a L p rto fr= 
2e m -S a t n rnasines vuo wfantaatonThEcno-
liTkxueeickseenta b4e-thebesowr- ,  fis.owe&h the- o r
ofazh, ,',* a -- ..3rG .y'... ..--C77.3& N: The- sa m LF tm&Ini
inPgeint G r r Cnr= s 511 'where rlmns
falleckTta rcv~h-h~i-z.Va
PLopelty-
Coxwnu v- IHAvxm % X-. Y.. Sup-. ftOnv--partner. onr selling his;itrs
asorp antfnga- u Lif ot~zernaras .eetmn~ttegat
n.tra4businessx wthesa- vilwag fo theL-t aof fiveg-yea- Afterwar.-
solicitecd. plnint gfor- at- though he- had& no pecuniay t er the-
bysiness. H-ed L-violation ofhis contract
The-decisioni thiscasis notbaseonL hefLcttha-th -parterwasthu-
S -1 onmr bxvqiaoe r- jnth m ;bu Ttth atEr:solctatkon.
of. business-for anoIftenisa'giolatio rofacaI c- not-to: carryv-os that busi-.
ness. The -intento-otecontract.a estopreventthTef-- -- , e:
ing into and- buildin upianother simartbusiness. Solicitatfon oETisiness
foranotherishI bniolatpsiuesforethatother amdtsmax latiozrof
trat o th loye -a-- r-rH LP ckf &O - aO26.whmerBMli7 lost
theprsuptonw&cLexist agis h-aiiyof acontractimrestraintof
tra etara aa its-i n the benefit of the cavenantof-
restraint T nugka .wgnnprmnlrotatn - i.validL the
n1UMIY wr-WLw'ver-relu &ygte CnitsbrncIT Tn-Cimt'v- War-
Iara 45 Iowa ot where thetsale waso the business; and- goodowilL thereo,
andt lowercourt
held hths~nLepomni~~ia salsmn~ would- consti-:
Laa 
erldh -h-S pe 
eC ut whc a t 
lfact7
th i ie h ora nceih h dexisotnte _tatesClsbmntC'the
son tesegt goof -wl agree in subtane- to. withdaw hielf nd. his
infsoluen noth merel- his. name. om competitin . hen. he- soicitsobusiness.
UNF'Ay3L UnroN-PxR=MM;T~X IsMuXCnoss-NAnoA..Bxcum .-v.
BAKgs-ncAL., g_ Eed.Rep..z357-' Uneedl ,"asappliedto abiscmit;,is s-proper
tradfe-mark, and the proprietor is entitled to, an: injunction: against- the USe- Of
- Iwantga" by another manufacturer astheame- of a similarbi-cuitputup aud-
sold~tcithetrade-in packages so similar astadeceive cnmnr.
This is in accordance with the decisiouofthe-tUhited-States Circuit:Zourt
in the case of A . Ia zirbank v. Central Lard Co., 64 Pd. Repr. 133. The law
is so plain on this subject thatitis. surprisingta ffft "n mh liation-ver-it..
